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RESUMEN: El Reino Unido tardó en adoptar medidas para abordar la pandemia de COVID-19. Sin 
embargo, el 23 de marzo de 2020 y después de las crecientes tasas de infección y mortalidad, el gobierno 
introdujo las medidas más restrictivas sobre el movimiento en la historia moderna del Reino Unido. 
Estas medidas de bloqueo que introdujeron una limitación radical en el movimiento fuera del hogar se 
introdujeron a través de la legislación estatutaria: regulaciones hechas por el gobierno y no debatidas ni 
legisladas por el Parlamento. Este artículo considera los problemas que las respuestas legales del Reino 
Unido para abordar el COVID-19 plantea en términos de democracia, derechos humanos y estado de 
derecho.
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ABSTRACT: The UK was initially slow to adopt measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic. However on 
23 March 2020 and following escalating infection and mortality rates, the government introduced the most 
restrictive measures on movement in modern UK history. These lockdown measures which introduced sweeping 
limitation on movement outside the home were introduced through statutory legislation: regulations which were 
made by the government and not debated nor legislated by Parliament. This article considers the issues the UK’s 
legal responses to address the COVID-19 raises in terms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
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1. Introduction. The UK initially downplayed concerns arising from the spread 
of COVID-19: Prime Minister Boris Johnson suggesting Britain should ‘take it 
on the chin’, pursued a policy which introduced no significant measures beyond 
encouraging hand-washing for 20 seconds. This changed, abruptly, on 12 March. 
On the same day schools and businesses were shut in Ireland and France, and 
three days after Italy was locked down, Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced 
a move to the delay phase and advised, though did not direct, over-70s to stay 
home, and travellers to avoid cruises. People should ‘avoid pubs and restaurants’, 
but they would not be closed. Large gatherings, such as the Cheltenham Festival, 
would not be prevented from going ahead. On 19 March following the rapid 
spread of the virus, the government announced that there was ‘zero prospect’ 
of a lockdown in London which would place limits on peoples’ movement. Four 
days later, on 23 March, the capital entered lockdown along with the rest of the 
country. ‘Zero prospect’ had lasted less than four days. 
2. The UK Acts to Address Coronavirus. Short of declaring a state of emergency, 
the government has instead ‘declared war’ on the virus, repeatedly underlining 
the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated ‘wartime-style mobilisation’. Targeted 
legislation was needed to introduce the scale of powers and measures needed 
to address the emergency, and to account for the fact that health is a devolved 
competence. The Coronavirus Bill, at 359 pages, was published on 19 March, and 
fast-tracked through Parliament to receive royal assent four parliamentary days 
later on 25 March. The Act provides for a myriad of measures aiming to address 
the COVID-19 crisis including supporting the health service and its workers, as well 
as reducing certain administrative checks relating to the certification of deaths, and 
the detention and treatment of mental health patients. 
The Act notably did not give or extend specific lockdown powers to 
government. The Secretary of State had at that point already enforced lockdown 
through secondary legislation under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 
1984 as amended in 2008 in light of the SARS outbreak. The Coronavirus Act 
2020 does, however, extend powers to quarantine those who have tested positive 
(or inconclusive) as well as to test those who may be suspected of the disease to 
authorities across the UK. Powers to restrict or close premises as well as the power 
to prohibit any gatherings are given to Ministers in each of the UK’s constitutive 
governments (the central government in Westminster, and the devolved 
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administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). The Coronavirus Act 
2020 was notably not excluded from the Human Rights Act 1998 (which gives 
legal recognition to the European Convention on Human Rights in the UK), and 
so powers under it can be subject to review for compatibility with ECHR rights. 
Notably from the question of privacy and surveillance, the Act (temporarily) 
amends the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to allow for the appointment of 
temporary judicial commissioners to issue arrest and surveillance warrants, as 
well as extending the time for retroactive approval of arrest warrants issued in 
urgent cases. Under the Coronavirus Act too, the Secretary of state may make 
regulations to extend the time that biometric samples (eg DNA and fingerprints) 
may be retained for national security.
The Act has a sunset clause of two years, with the option for parliament 
approved six-month extensions beyond that point. This was initially met with 
strong opposition against such a long period. It can be contrasted with the Scottish 
equivalent Coronavirus (Scotland) Act 2020, which has been drafted to include 
only a six-month sunset clause with option for renewal. One concession accepted 
by Government in the form of an amendment to the Coronavirus Act 2020, is that 
there will be a six-month Parliamentary review in the form of a debate on the date 
of the expiry of the Act. This follows two-month status reports, and a debate on 
non-devolved matters in the Act in both Houses of Parliament after a year, should 
the powers still be in effect in March 2021. 
A welcomed aspect of the Coronavirus Act is its self-containment. While the 
Act has introduced temporary amendments to other Acts, its provisions only 
relate, and can only be interpreted as relating, to COVID-19. Upon the expiry of 
the Act, its effects – even where it has modified other primary acts – disappear. 
In distinction to concerns in other states as to the permanent changes to the law 
following the introduction of these emergency powers, the Coronavirus Act 2020 
is not expected, or designed, to create any permanent change.
3. Who Restricts the Restrictions? The most restrictive measures on movement 
in modern UK history were made via statutory instrument by the Secretary of 
State under the Public Health Act 1984. The Regulations for England and Wales 
state in near identical prohibition: ‘During the emergency period, no person may 
leave the place where they are living without reasonable excuse.’ The ‘emergency 
period’ can last up to six months, as determined by the Secretary of State on 
a three-weekly basis. The list of thirteen exceptions (or reasonable excuses) to 
the rule include: to obtain basic necessities including food and medicines, to take 
exercise, as well as to seek medical advice and to provide care and assistance. In 
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order to attend a funeral as a friend, no other members of the family or household 
must be attending. Amid escalating rates of domestic abuse, a final ‘reasonable 
excuse’ is ‘to avoid injury or illness or to escape a risk of harm’. Similar prohibitions 
were made under equivalent legislation in Northern Ireland and Scotland.
A regulation is not primary legislation: it is not debated, scrutinised or 
legislated by Parliament. The Regulations came into force the same day they were 
laid. However, as the Regulation is under the affirmative procedure, it must be 
approved by Parliament within 28 of coming into force. Its legality rests on its the 
interpretation of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, and provisions 
which allow a Minister to make a ‘special restriction or requirement’ ‘on where [a 
person] goes or with whom [a person] has contact’. To interpret these sections 
as allowing for a nationwide lockdown of the entire population has been variously 
argued to be ‘suitable and necessary’, ‘up to the limit of what is permitted under 
its parent statute, and arguably beyond’, and, as the ‘legal underpinnings of the 
provisions are so thin’ the Regulation is ultra vires – and unlawful. An answer, and 
preferred in my opinion, would have been for the lockdown to have been based 
on an Act of Parliament with such legislative scrutiny and appropriate democratic, 
rights and rule of law safeguards as this would provide. This could even have been 
within the Coronavirus Act 2020, which would then supersede and replace the 
Regulations which are secondary legislation made by government ministers.
Even where there was little scrutiny (yet), there are some safeguards: the 1984 
Health Act requires measures introduced to be proportionate, and compatible 
with ECHR rights. Balancing the legitimate aim of protecting public health against 
the protection of civil liberties, and in particular the rights of liberty (Article 5 
ECHR, in restricting movement to thirteen reasoned excuses), religion (Article 9 
ECHR in restricting religious services including funerals), and freedom of assembly 
and association (Art 11 ECHR in limiting any gatherings of people) should not 
be seen in the absolute sense as it creates an unjustifiable ‘rights versus health’ 
paradigm. Instead, measures adopted, and powers used, must be proportionate to 
the limitation on rights they are imposing, plausibly on a case-by-case basis.
The Police are empowered under the Regulations to question people why 
they are out, and if not satisfied the answers fall under the 13 reasonable excuses 
may issue a £30 fine, £120 on the second offence and then doubling with each 
successive offence to £960. While the police are instructed to ‘persuade, cajole, 
negotiate and advise’ as a primary approach, if the person still refuses to comply, 
the police may use ‘reasonable force’ where they deem necessary to return the 
person home. 
A number of incidents involving the (inappropriate) use of powers have been 
reported. Concerns have also been raised that there may be targeted use of 
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these powers to police minority groups. While not indicative of the probability (or 
possibility) of systemic or widespread misuse of powers, it highlights the critical 
lack of communication as to the legal use of the powers. This creates critical 
concerns where there is disparity in the application of the law, particularly where 
there is little guidance on what constitutes a ‘reasonable belief ’ in what may not 
be an exhaustive list of excuses. The Regulation allows for people to leave their 
home ‘to obtain basic necessities, including food’: this cannot and does not mean 
police have search powers to ensure people are purchasing ‘only essential food’. 
Clear understanding of the application of the Act and the Regulation is essential. 
The primary concern which delayed the introduction of these measures 
was that the population would quickly become ‘fatigued’ with them. However, 
disproportionate or discriminatory (mis)use of these powers will foster not only 
fatigue, but frustration. Legal certainty and transparency are vital. On this, the 
Scottish Police Force should be lauded for the appointment of an independent 
reviewer to oversee the use of new emergency powers. A first, and most 
important step however to support police forces throughout the country already 
under enormous pressure to ensure social distancing measures to restrict the 
spread of COVID-19 is to ensure all know what the law requires – and what it 
does not.
4. Virtual Justice and Democracy. The UK Parliament rose for Easter recess 
on 25 March and is due to return on 21 April 2020. On the expectation that 
social distancing measures would still be in place on that date, the Lord Speaker 
urged for the Parliament to operate ‘virtually’ in order to fulfil its constitutional 
functions to debate, legislate, and scrutinise the actions of government. Virtual 
meetings of the Select Committees have already been successfully trialled, and 
the first online Privy Council meeting with the Queen in history was held on 
3 April 2020. To echo the Lord Speaker, such action to ensure the continuity 
of the ordinary functions of Parliament, even in an extraordinary time, is ‘vital’. 
Meaningful scrutiny, as recommended by the Bingham Centre, is needed to ensure 
Parliamentary sovereignty over the executive and the effective consideration of 
the proportionate, justified, and intended use of powers under the Health Act and 
the Coronavirus Act 2020. 
The Coronavirus Act 2020 postpones local elections, mayoral, police and 
crime commissioner elections which had been due to be held in May 2020 by a 
year until May 2021. It also delays the decennial electoral registration canvas that 
was due in Northern Ireland in 2020. While determining the preferable policy 
was to delay public plebiscite, the Coronavirus Act 2020 did make provision for 
the expansion of the availability of video links for criminal, civil, family and tribunal 
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proceedings, including for public participation. However, such provisions may not 
provide sufficient support for vulnerable defendants, nor those without or with 
limited access to technology and the internet. Paired with the equal but opposite 
concern of not holding proceedings leading to lengthy postponements, it is possible 
that future cases based on the infringement of the Article 6 ECHR right to a 
fair trial may arise. Most likely, whether justice and democracy will move virtually 
entirely online in the UK, will soon be more of a question of the practicality rather 
than principle.
5. Conclusion. As of 16 April 2020, there have been 13,729 confirmed 
coronavirus-related deaths in the UK. The country is forecast to become the 
worst affected state in Europe. COVID-19 is a global crisis, but it necessitates 
first and foremost shared national and individual action. Clear, consistent, correct, 
and constant guidance is needed from the UK government. This will only have 
the effect of tackling the spread of misinformation on the virus, but is also critical 
to guarantee both legal certainty and the transparency of government action, 
necessary to build trust in the government’s measures in response to the pandemic. 
The most significant question, and one which will be asked with increasing 
frequency if and as the lockdown extends into May, will be how to govern the 
effective and proportionate use of the most extremely restrictive measures in 
modern history. The greatest concern is that this pandemic will not cause one of 
highest death tolls in the UK during peacetime but may also permanently damage 
the health of UK democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 
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